



Fragile Peace, Elusive Justice

Population-Based Survey on Perceptions and Attitudes
about Security and Justice in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire

Phuong N. Pham and Patrick Vinck

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
SERIES ON PEACE, JUSTICE AND RECONSTRUCTION



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the results of a mixed-methods study conducted in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, to assess the population's perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes about security and justice. The study included a survey of 1,000 randomly selected adult residents, to provide results that are representative of the population of the city of Abidjan. The specific objectives of this study were to:

1. Assess the overall exposure to violence among the population in Abidjan.
2. Document attitudes and opinions about transitional justice mechanisms.
3. Examine how the population gathers information about the International Criminal Court (ICC), what factors influence Ivorians' knowledge of the Court, and what correlation exists between information sources and perceptions.

Detailed results provided in the report outline the challenges of rebuilding peace and achieving justice after a decade of conflict, and just two years after a dramatic post-election crisis. The report reveals a population that has little or no trust in its government and in each other, concerned with its economic well-being, and somewhat divided about holding accountable the perpetrators of serious crimes during the post-election violence. Specific highlights of the findings are as follows:

- The report shows low levels of general trust toward local and political leaders, including mistrust of them as sources of information. About three out of four respondents declared having little or no trust in local or municipal authorities (79%), in departmental authorities (78%), or in national authorities (73%). Just 14% of the re-

spondents felt that elected officials at the national level represented their interests.

- Respondents further reported mistrust among themselves. About two-thirds of the respondents had little or no trust toward neighbors (69%), members of their own ethnic group (62%), or members of another ethnic group (69%), people with the same political opinions as theirs (67%), and people with other political opinions (78%). This mistrust was a driver of the sense of insecurity among respondents. Specifically, respondents felt least safe when meeting strangers or traveling to other neighborhoods. Trust between people was lower at the time of this survey compared to before the electoral violence.
- One-third of respondents felt able to participate in national (34%) or city-level (35%) political processes, and only slightly more felt they were able to participate in such processes at community- (39%) and local (46%) levels.
- The lack of trust extends to the security and justice sectors as well. Most respondents (62%) reported having little or no trust in the police. However, most respondents (66%) felt safe or very safe meeting policemen, and 64 percent of the respondents indicated they had little or no trust in the justice system. One of the main grievances respondents mentioned about the justice sector is that they view it as a corrupt system benefitting the powerful.
- The population nevertheless perceives the police to be a primary point of contact to resolve crimes and disputes. Respondents most frequently said that the population itself (53%) resolves disputes, but 27 percent said they would generally contact the police. In cases of physical violence, theft, murder, or sexual violence, over three-quarters of the respondents said they would contact the police.

- Respondents most frequently mentioned that nobody provided security in their neighborhood. Some identified themselves (21%), private security guards (11%), or God (10%) as providing security. The police were mentioned by more than one in four respondents (27%) and the national army was cited by 6 percent.
- Civilians paid a heavy toll as a result of the 2010–2011 post-election violence. Displacement (50%) and separation from household family members (38%) were the most frequently reported events. Experiences as a witness were also relatively frequent, including witnessing fighting (36%), looting (33%), beating and torture (31%), and killing (25%). Regarding direct experiences, over one in four respondents (26%) had property stolen or destroyed, and five percent were physically attacked or beaten.
- Respondents identified several transitional justice mechanisms and processes as necessary to achieve peace. These included (1) establishing the truth (20%), (2) creating dialog between ethnic groups (20%), (3) granting amnesties (9%), (4) to arresting/jailing those responsible for the violence (9%), and (5) compensating victims (5%). When asked directly, over one-half of the respondents said that it was important to hold the perpetrators of violence accountable (55%) and that obtaining justice for the violence was necessary (69%).
- A majority of respondents had heard about the ICC (94%), most frequently on television (78%). However, just 5 percent described their knowledge of the Court as good or very good.
- Respondents' perceptions of the ICC were similar to those they held regarding state institutions, as 67 percent reported little or no trust in the ICC. When asked more openly about the ICC, about one-half of the respondents were positive about the Court. Respondents' views on the effect of the ICC on peace and justice, however, remain divided. About one-third said that the Court had a positive impact on peace (35%), and 34 percent said the Court

had a negative impact on peace. The others were neutral (31%). Similar views were expressed regarding the current and future impact of the Court on justice.

- Most (69%) felt that it was important to know the origin of the conflict and that it was important to establish the truth about what happened.
- Reparations are seen as important, with tangible assets being identified as the most important forms of compensation, including money (43%), food (20%), and farm animals (10%).

Based on these findings, as well as the more detailed results presented throughout this report, the following key recommendations are made to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire; international actors, including relevant organs of the UN and the ICC; and civil society actors, including individuals and organizations within Côte d'Ivoire and international non-governmental organizations:

1. Address key economic priorities (especially employment).
2. Emphasize rebuilding trust between the state and its citizens as a core component of the reconstruction effort—a renewed social contract—with a focus on local level authorities (the least trusted). Develop and support programs that strengthen linkages between communities and institutions.
3. Deploy, train, and properly equip police officers; examine and potentially expand the current mandate of the police to ensure that services are available locally; and contribute to rebuilding trust and reducing violence.
4. Ensure the independence of the justice system. Specifically, adopt and support anti-corruption policies and programs to re-establish the rule of law and support the local prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities from all sides to the conflict

5. Build on the outcome of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and further support the National Social Cohesion Program as a means of engaging the population in a constructive dialogue about the conflict. Involve the media in this process, especially television in Abidjan.
6. Provide sufficient human and financial support to the special investigative cell within the Justice Ministry investigating the 2010–2011 post-election violence, and guarantee its judicial independence.
7. Develop a reparations program that is unbiased and financially realistic to address the strong demand for reparations among the population. This program will need to address and manage expectations for individual financial compensation as a key component of reparation.
8. Outreach in Abidjan about justice, especially the ICC, should take advantage of the high level of access to television among the population to establish ongoing communication and exchanges with those affected by the conflict.
9. The ICC should coordinate its work with national and international efforts to strengthen the justice sector to rebuild trust and credibility in national justice institutions.

1. INTRODUCTION

In November 2010, eight years after eruption of civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, presidential elections were supposed to mark a significant step toward peace. Instead, the bitterly fought election campaign resulted in a rapid escalation of violence and ultimately renewed the civil war, as run-off candidates both claimed electoral victory.¹ Though international actors recognized former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara as the electoral victor, President Laurent Gbagbo relied on his control over national institutions to retain power.²

The stand-off led to widespread violence between Ouattara's and Gbagbo's supporters and against the civilian population, often along political, ethnic, and religious lines. The United Nations (UN) reported that the violence caused "more than 3,000 deaths, thousands of refugees and internally displaced people, and destruction of property" over five months.³ Gbagbo was ultimately defeated and arrested by pro-Ouattara forces in April 2011. As Ouattara was sworn into office and called for reconciliation and forgiveness, prospects for peace improved. However, three years later, deep political and societal divides remain.

Achieving impartial justice and accountability for the violence and serious crimes in this context is challenging. On the one hand, seeking accountability may rekindle conflict because of the deep social divisions. On the other hand, persistent political tensions and sporadic violence are seen as an outcome of the lack of accountability, highlighting the need to bring perpetrators from both sides to justice. Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November 2011 to face charges of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution, and inhumane acts. Proceedings in national courts have been slow and evi-

dently biased toward pro-Gbagbo perpetrators. The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation, or CDVR) established in 2011—as well as other accountability mechanisms created at the national level—have failed to contribute significantly to reconciliation.

As the country prepares for new presidential elections in 2015, Côte d'Ivoire is once again confronted with the prospect of electoral violence and societal division, prompting urgent calls to deliver justice, promote reconciliation, and disarm fighters.

This report provides the results of a study that was undertaken to improve understanding of the population's priorities for peacebuilding, justice, and accountability. The report is based on consultations with key informants and a survey of 1,000 randomly selected respondents in the country's largest city, Abidjan.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. History and Civil Unrest

For much of the first three decades following Côte d'Ivoire's independence from France in 1960, the country enjoyed prosperity and economic growth. Under the leadership of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the country became a leading exporter of cocoa and coffee.

In 1990, Houphouët-Boigny won his seventh mandate, defeating Laurent Gbagbo, a southerner. After legislative elections, Alassane Ouattara, a northerner, was named prime minister with strong international backing. By then, however, the country had been shaken by a sharp decline in prices on the world market for Côte d'Ivoire's primary exports, resulting in a financial crisis, followed by devaluation of the country's currency and structural adjustment.⁴ The worsening economic conditions prompted protests and civil unrest that were further spurred by demands for a more democratic government. Government forces, in part under the leadership of then Chief of Staff Robert Gueï, repressed the protests harshly.

The death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 fueled the emerging tensions and political rivalries, marking the beginning of two decades of instability. Henri Konan Bédié, president of the National Assembly, became president under the terms of the constitution. However, Bédié's opposition to democratic reforms led Alassane Ouattara to resign as prime minister, creating a division in the ruling party. Ultimately, a new party made up of Ouattara's supporters arose.⁵

Politicians quickly used the population's economic disparities to exacerbate divisions throughout the country. At the same time, the concept of "Ivoirité" became a major aspect of political discourse, drawing a

xenophobic distinction between Ivorians and foreigners, including descendants of these two groups. The proliferation of this notion was in part the result of the influx of immigrants that was driven by the labor demand in the cocoa industry. The divide was marked along geographic, ethnic, and religious lines and also emerged between the Christian "Ivorian" south and the Muslim-dominated north populated by a large number of immigrants and descendants of immigrants from neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali).⁶

The concept of Ivoirité was incorporated by the 1994 Electoral Code, which restricted the right to vote and stand for presidency to only Ivorian nationals with complete Ivoirian parenthood who had resided in the country for five years prior to the election. This rule, in effect, barred Alassane Ouattara from the presidency, as he was accused of not being born in Côte d'Ivoire and of having a father allegedly born in today's Burkina Faso. Bédié won the 1995 presidential election, but his rule continued to be marked by increasing ethnic tensions, occasionally violent, directed against African foreigners.

In 1999, one year before the scheduled presidential election of 2000, ongoing harassment and intimidation of northerners prompted large-scale demonstrations in Abidjan. By the end of the year, General Robert Guéï had seized power from Bédié. Following this coup, contested presidential elections ultimately took place, with Ouattara barred from running. Gbagbo claimed an electoral victory, and Guéï fled the country, while fighting continued between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara supporters. Over the next few years, several coups were attempted, including a 2002 putsch by a group of dissatisfied army officers from marginalized groups in the north, known as the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Although failing to seize power, they gained control over the north of the country, starting Côte d'Ivoire's first civil war. Both sides in this war were accused of committing widespread, systematic crimes in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, such as the use of child soldiers, extrajudicial killings, and sexual violence.

In January 2003, at the invitation of France, the opposing forces in the conflict came together and negotiated the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. Under Resolution 1479, the UN Security Council established a peacekeeping mission known as the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (French acronym MINUCI) in May 2003 that was mandated to observe and facilitate implementation of the Accords. Later in 2003, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with support from France, deployed another peacekeeping mission to help stabilize the situation. UN Security Council Resolution 1528 consolidated the two forces by establishing the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). UNOCI, comprised of about 8,000 troops, absorbed both the ECOWAS forces and MINUCI, and operated alongside the French forces remaining in the country. Although UNOCI had a robust mandate under Resolution 1528, it proved unable to prevent government forces from attacking the FN or to protect civilians caught in continuing outbreaks of violence.⁷

Elections initially scheduled for 2005 were delayed multiple times as the country slowly transitioned out of war. When elections finally took place in 2010, Ivorians widely hoped that the years of conflict and transition would come to an end. But political rivalries and divisions ultimately proved too strong to allow for a peaceful process. Ouattara, Bédié, and Gbagbo were the leading candidates, with Ouattara and Gbagbo entering the election's second round. Violence once again resumed as both candidates claimed victory. Gbagbo refused to step down from power, and Ouattara sought the support of the former rebel forces that had controlled most of the north of the country since the 2002—2003 conflict.⁸

On March 30, 2011, the UN Security Council recognized Ouattara as Côte d'Ivoire's President and also authorized UNOCI to “use all necessary means” to protect civilians.⁹ In the weeks that followed, violent clashes continued across the country but centered, in particular, around Abidjan and Gbagbo's residence. With UN and French airstrikes providing support, Ouattara's forces—now known as the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire, FRCI)—

succeeded in capturing Gbagbo, ending the post-election crisis in May 2011.¹⁰ Ouattara took the oath of office as President on May 21, 2011.¹¹

Legislative elections took place in December 2011, the first time in eleven years, and the new National Assembly had its first session in April 2012. As a result, state authority, including the authority of judges and civil servants, was restored in the north. Even though the government has made significant progress in the rehabilitation of courthouses and prisons that were damaged during the conflict, there are still concerns regarding the judiciary's lack of independence and the marginalization and lack of resources faced by law enforcement actors.¹²

Despite the end of the conflict, insecurity has persisted throughout the country, slowing the reconciliation process and interfering with government attempts to address impunity and restore the rule of law.¹³ Both sides reportedly committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during the conflict.¹⁴

2.2. Impacts of Civil Unrest

The years of conflict throughout Côte d'Ivoire have had enormous impacts on various aspects of society. One of the biggest consequences of the country's civil war in 2010 was the displacement of over 1,000,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and over 200,000 refugees, many of whom sought refuge in Liberia, and the massive return of migrant workers from neighboring countries to their countries of origin (for example, as many as 2,000,000 Malians).¹⁵ The situation of those forcibly displaced has remained critical well beyond the end of the post-election violence, with little to no governmental protection, as illustrated by the attack on the Nahibly Camp for IDPs by villagers from Duekoue in July 2012. The general improvements in the country's security situation eventually enabled many IDPs and refugees to return to their home locations or to resettle.¹⁶ The political unrest also exacerbated child labor and the trafficking of children.¹⁷ Health and medical

services were extremely limited throughout the country, especially in the north.¹⁸

Along with the displacement of thousands of civilians, due to the disruption of major trade routes, the civil unrest also had a negative impact on the country's economy and that of neighboring countries.¹⁹ Companies and financial establishments closed their doors due to the country's poor security and due to banking restrictions imposed by the Central Bank of West African States.²⁰ The agricultural sector, however, was somewhat sheltered from the political turmoil. Production and exportation of cocoa was not greatly harmed, possibly because the trade helped fuel the conflict.²¹

2.3. Accountability and ICC Involvement

After the country's civil unrest, domestic and international initiatives were launched with the goal of holding perpetrators of serious crimes accountable for their acts, promoting reconciliation, and reintegrating combatants, with a particular focus on youths. President Ouattara created three entities within the government to seek accountability for crimes: the National Commission of Inquiry, the Special Investigative Cell, and the CDVR.

The National Commission of Inquiry, which President Ouattara established in June 2011 with a six-month mandate that could be renewed once, was tasked with investigating violations of human rights and humanitarian law related to the post-election violence in 2010 and 2011.²² The Commission published a report in August 2013 about the crimes committed during the post-election conflict. According to Human Rights Watch, "Although lacking in details on specific incidents, the report's balance in situating responsibility was noteworthy—documenting 1,009 summary executions by pro-Gbagbo forces and 545 summary executions by the Republican Forces."²³

The Special Investigative Cell, established within the Ministry of Justice, was tasked with investigating and prosecuting serious crimes punishable under national law, including crimes against the state, economic crimes, and other serious crimes. The Cell is made up of magistrates, registrars, and judicial police officers and has carried out six judicial procedures, heard from over 3,500 victims and witnesses, and charged close to 140 people.²⁴ Civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders, however, have criticized the Cell for failing to initiate proceedings against supporters of President Ouattara.²⁵ In 2013, the Special Investigative Cell continued its investigation of crimes during the post-election unrest. However, according to Human Rights Watch, the efforts of this Cell to administer impartial justice have been hampered by “the absence of a prosecutorial strategy” and the lack of efforts to reach the victims of crimes among supporters of Gbagbo.²⁶ In September 2013, the government assigned more judges and prosecutors to the Cell, which has been seen as a positive sign, despite some people’s perceptions that there is a lack of political will to prosecute the forces who supported President Ouattara. The Special Investigative Cell was scheduled to be dismantled in December 2013.²⁷

Along with the Special Investigative Cell and the National Commission of Inquiry, the government also established the CDVR on July 13, 2011, with a two-year mandate. The goal of this Commission was to determine independently the truth about past and recent social and political unrest, in order to help the country achieve national reconciliation on the basis of respect for and coexistence between all people within the country. Training for the Commission was organized in cooperation with UNOCI and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.²⁸ In November 2013, the Commission gave President Ouattara its final report documenting human rights abuses and the causes of the successive crises in the country since the 1999 coup. Despite these efforts, some experts believe that the Commission did not create a political dialogue that led to concrete results. In particular, they believe the Commission focused too much on the causes of the country’s conflict, rather than seeking the truth about events that occurred during the

unrest, overlooking the victims of the conflict.²⁹ These limitations, combined with a lack of funding and alleged politicization of the Commission, explain the overall perception of failure.

In addition to the accountability efforts pursued by the government of Côte d'Ivoire, there has also been international involvement in accountability processes, particularly through the ICC, for the crimes committed during the conflict. The ICC has charged three individuals for crimes allegedly committed in the course of the post-election violence. The first of these is former President Laurent Gbagbo. Although Côte d'Ivoire did not become a State Party to the ICC until February 2013, the Court has jurisdiction over incidents that occurred in the country since 2003 through a special government declaration recognizing ICC jurisdiction.³⁰ On October 18, 2011, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire signed a cooperative agreement with the ICC, through which the government enforced the arrest warrant for Gbagbo and transferred him to the ICC on November 29, 2011.³¹ The ICC has charged Gbagbo as an indirect co-perpetrator on four counts of crimes against humanity (murder, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, and other inhumane acts) committed during the post-election violence between December 16, 2010 and April 2011.³² The prosecution, however, has experienced a number of set-backs. Gbagbo's defense team challenged the admissibility of the ICC case against him on the basis that national proceedings against him are ongoing. This admissibility challenge was rejected, but in June 2013, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to adjourn the hearing on the confirmation of charges against Gbagbo due, in part, to the Prosecutor's overreliance on non-governmental organizations and UN reports as evidence. Gbagbo remains currently in The Hague, where he denies the charges against him.³³

In addition to Laurent Gbagbo, his wife, Simone Gbagbo, also faces charges—which she too denies—by the ICC. The ICC alleges that she bears individual criminal responsibility as a co-perpetrator for four counts of crimes against humanity (murder, rape and other sexual vio-

lence, persecution, and other inhumane acts) committed during the post-election violence.³⁴ The ICC released an arrest warrant on November 22, 2012 and asked government officials to surrender her.³⁵ However, in September 2013, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire said that it would not transfer Simone Gbagbo to the ICC, stating its intent to file a motion for the dismissal of the ICC warrant and instead try her in a domestic court.³⁶ She remains under house arrest in Côte d'Ivoire.

The third person charged by the ICC is Charles Blé Goudé, a political leader who was a close ally of Laurent Gbagbo. He, too, has been charged as an indirect co-perpetrator on four counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, and other inhumane acts.³⁷ Blé Goudé was transferred to The Hague in March 2014.

2.4. Continuing Tensions

Despite the reconciliation and accountability efforts that have been pursued both domestically and internationally, ongoing tensions remain within Côte d'Ivoire that could lead to further unrest. Domestic justice initiatives established by the government have lacked impartiality. Specifically, the Special Investigative Cell within the Ministry of Justice has charged over 150 people, none of whom are supporters of Ouattara.³⁸

Due in part to the lack of impartial justice, it has become extremely difficult to unify the nation's security forces. These forces are composed primarily of supporters of President Ouattara, the same people who killed Gbagbo supporters in the post-election violence, making it extremely difficult to re-integrate Gbagbo supporters.³⁹ Additionally, the national security forces continue to face accusations of human rights abuses committed against ethnic groups that supported Gbagbo.⁴⁰ Also, security is of particular concern in the western part of Côte d'Ivoire and in certain parts of Abidjan, where abuses and serious crimes have escalated. According to a 2012 report of UN Independent

Experts on the situation of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire, women in the country have expressed concern about elevated levels of physical violence, including sexual violence, directed against women.⁴¹

Land ownership issues are also contributing to the continuing tensions within the country. The tensions around land ownership, particularly in the western part of the country, have persisted for years due to the fertility of the land, which has facilitated the growth of cocoa and coffee beans. Many members of groups indigenous to these lands resent other ethnic groups and people from other countries who have gained ownership of this land. During the post-election violence, many pro-Gbagbo residents in the western part of the country fled as Ouattara gained control, causing these individuals to lose their land. Currently, land dispossession due to the conflict continues to fuel communal unrest and distrust in this region. The government made modest reforms to the country's nationality and rural land tenure laws in August 2013, but these laws still fall short of international law, particularly regarding the rights of returning refugees. As a result, land in the west continues to be acquired through illegal means, leading the forests to be cut down for cocoa and coffee growth.⁴²

3. THE STUDY

This study was conducted in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, to assess the population's perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes towards security, justice, accountability, and the ICC. The survey focused on Abidjan because the city experienced some of the heaviest fighting between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces. The decade of violence, however, affected the entire country, and a more comprehensive follow-up study is anticipated.

The specific objectives of the present survey were to:

1. Examine how the population gathers information about the ICC, what factors influence Ivorians' knowledge of the Court, and what correlation exists between information sources and perceptions;
2. Assess the overall exposure to violence among the population in Abidjan; and
3. Document attitudes and opinions about transitional justice mechanisms in general.

To achieve its objectives, the study used a mixed-methods approach and a survey of 1,000 randomly selected adult residents. The survey was designed to provide results that are representative of the population of the city of Abidjan.

3.1. Survey Design and Sample

The selection of respondents for the survey was based on a multi-stage random geographic cluster sampling procedure. During the first phase of the study, we randomly selected 500 Global Positioning System (GPS) locations within the political boundaries of Abidjan. Each of the ten

communes of Abidjan was assigned a number of points proportionate to its population size. When possible, approximate street addresses or local points of interest were associated with the GPS coordinates.


Two interviewers, one male and one female, were assigned to each point. The interviewers used geo-tracking tools to navigate to the assigned coordinates. At the location, interviewers located the two nearest dwellings in randomly selected directions. They assigned numbers to all members of the households above the age of 18, and randomly selected one person to be interviewed. A household was defined as a group of people who normally sleep under the same roof and eat together. In the event that the selected individual/household was not available for an interview, interviewers were instructed to make three contact attempts before seeking a different individual/household.

In total, the interviewers approached 1,217 dwellings. At 217 (18%) of these dwellings, the interviewers could not conduct interviews, at 67 dwellings because nobody was present after three attempts and at 120 dwellings because the eligible adults refused to participate. Thirty dwellings were replaced for other reasons (e.g. respondent unable to participate due to illness). At the 1,000 dwellings where interviews occurred, interviewers approached a total of 1,090 adults who reported being 18 years old or older and conducted 1,000 interviews. Of the 90 individuals who were approached but not interviewed, 31 selected adults refused to participate, 47 selected adults were absent and could not be contacted, and 12 selected adults did not participate for other reasons. The questionnaire took an average of one hour to administer.

The survey's margin of error for the entire sample is ± 3.0 percentage points. This means that in 95 out of every 100 samples drawn using the same methodology, estimated proportions based on the entire sample will be no more than 3.0 percentage points away from their true values in the population.

The Partners Health Care Human Research Committee and the Harvard School of Public Health reviewed and approved the study protocol. In Abidjan, an *ad hoc* group of experts provided a similar review, and authorities in Côte d'Ivoire were informed of the study. Approval to conduct interviews was also obtained from local authorities at each survey site. The interviewers obtained verbal informed consent from each selected participant. Interviewers offered neither monetary nor other material incentives to interviewees in exchange for participation.

Figure 1: Sample distribution (500 sampled points)



3.2. Research Instruments

The research team developed the questionnaire and consent form in English and French after consultation with experts in the field and a review of relevant literature and documents made available by the Public Information and Documentation Section at the ICC. The resulting survey instrument was a standardized semi-structured questionnaire made up of 13 sections addressing: (1) demographics, (2) priorities and services, (3) information, (4) wealth, (5) trust, (6) elections and participation, (7) disputes (general), (8) safety and security, (9) peacebuilding, (10) justice and accountability, (11) the ICC, (12) truth, reparation, and memorials, and (13) exposure to violence. Respondents were asked open-ended questions with no suggested answers, with the exception of certain questions that employed a scaling format (i.e., the Likert scale, ranging from very good to very bad). For non-scaled questions, response options based on pilot interviews were provided to the interviewer for coding but were never provided as options to interviewees. An open-ended field was available for interviewers to record complete responses if the responses could not be coded. The team validated the instruments using pilot surveys to ensure that the questions were easily understood and appropriate for the context.

Once the questionnaire was finalized, it was programmed into Android Nexus 7 Tablets running KoBoToolbox, our custom data collection package.⁴³ The use of the tablets allowed interviewers to enter the data directly as the interviewers conducted interviews. Built-in verification systems reduced the risk of skipping questions or entering erroneous values, resulting in data of a high quality.

3.3. Data Collection and Analysis

The data collection took place over an eleven-day period from December 7, 2013, to December 17, 2013. Five teams, composed of one supervisor and four interviewers, organized in two pairs, collected the

data under the guidance of the field coordinators and lead researchers. The interviewers were all professionals with research experience. Prior to collecting the data, interviewers participated in a five-day training workshop that explained the objectives and content of the study, survey and interview techniques, use of the tablets for data collection, troubleshooting, and methods for solving technical problems. The training included mock interviews and pilot-testing with randomly selected individuals at non-sampled sites.

The research protocol required each individual to visit four points per day, conducting one interview at each point, for a total of four interviews per day. Interviews were conducted one-on-one, anonymously, and in confidential settings. At the end of each day, the data were synchronized with a central computer, enabling the lead researchers to check data for completion, consistency, and outliers. The lead researchers and supervisors discussed any issues that arose with the team prior to the next data collection. Once the data collection was completed, the database was imported into Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 16 for data analysis. The results presented here are adjusted for the complex sample design and weighted to correct known disproportionate stratification of the sample and unequal probability of selection down to the household level.

3.4. Limitations

The present study was developed and implemented carefully to ensure that the results would accurately represent the views and opinions of the adult population residing in Abidjan during the data collection period in December 2013. As with any social science research, there are limitations.

The sample was designed rigorously to maximize the representativeness of the population of Abidjan, resulting in a sample size of 1,000 respondents. However, some selected individuals could not be interviewed for various reasons (see Section 3.1: Survey Design and

Sample). It is uncertain how responses from individuals who could not be interviewed would have differed from those of the sampled individuals, but the sampling approach was designed to reduce any potential for selection biases. Results also represent the adult population at the time of the survey, and opinions may change over time.


The study relies on a self-reported method of data collection. A number of factors may have affected the quality and validity of the data collected. These factors include inaccurate recall of past events, misunderstanding of the questions or concepts, reactivity to the interviewer due to the sensitive nature of the questions, and intentional misreporting (e.g., for socially unacceptable answers). We minimized such risks through careful development of the questionnaire to make the questions sufficiently clear and to reduce potential bias (see Section 3.2: Research Instruments).

3.5. Characteristics of Respondents

This report aims to present perceptions about justice, peace, and reconstruction in a representative sample of the adult population of Abidjan. This sample contained an equal number of women (500 people) and men (500 people), reflecting the gender distribution of the overall population of Côte d'Ivoire. The mean age of respondents was 33 years old, with roughly one-third of the respondents aged 18 to 25 years old (30%), roughly one-third aged 26 to 35 years old (38%), and roughly one-third aged 36 years old or older (32%). A majority of respondents (56%) reported being single, and 40 percent reported being in a marital relationship. Sixty-four percent of the respondents indicated having children. With regard to education, 13 percent of respondents indicated having no formal education, 14 percent had some primary education and 7 percent completed primary education but had no secondary education. The majority (66%) had at least some secondary education, including 23 percent with university-level education. On average, women in the sample were less educated than men. Specifi-

cally, 19 percent of the female respondents had no formal education compared to 7 percent of the male respondents, and just 15 percent of the female respondents had university-level education compared to 31 percent of the male respondents. These results are consistent with recent demographic and health data on educational achievement, which suggests a gender disparity in educational levels, including overall higher levels of education in Abidjan compared to the rest of the country.⁴⁴

Figure 2: Ethnic composition of sample



Abidjan has a diverse ethnic composition reflecting Côte d'Ivoire's four major groups: the Akan, Mandé, Gour, and Kru. The sample reflected data on ethnic composition in the population, with the Akan accounting for 42 percent of the sample, the Mandé for 22 percent, the Gour for 11 percent, and the Kru for 11 percent. Together, these four groups accounted for 86 percent of the sampled population.

In terms of religious beliefs, 36 percent of the respondents described themselves as Muslim, 29 percent as Catholic, 14 percent as Protestants, 12 percent as Evangelical Christians, and 9 percent as belonging to another religious affiliation.

4. UNDERSTANDING PRIORITIES

The post-election violence in Côte d'Ivoire worsened the effects of a decade of political and economic crisis. The violence affected the delivery of basic services and disrupted the functioning of an already fragile security and justice sector. Understanding the overall priorities of the population is necessary to provide a nuanced portrait of the context that frames the perceptions about justice, peace, and reconstruction explored in this report.

4.1. Respondents' Priorities

Using an open-ended question interview methodology, interviewers assessed respondents' main priority (one response) and what respondents thought the main priority of the government should be (one response). The most frequently identified priority, mentioned by 35 percent of respondents, was work or employment, reflecting a decade of worsening poverty and the negative impact of the conflict on the economy (the country's GDP contracted by 5 percent in 2011). Achieving peace was the second most frequently cited priority (identified by 19% of respondents), followed by money (11% of respondents) and basic needs such as education (9% of respondents) and health (6% of respondents). Priorities for the government reflected respondents' own priorities, with a focus on economic growth and employment (37%). Ensuring security was the second most common answer (14% of respondents). Security was not mentioned frequently as an individual priority but peace was the second most important individual priority, possibly reflecting the view that peace translates to a matter of security when discussing government priorities. Other main priorities for the government include assisting the poor and vulnerable (8% of respondents).

ents), improving the population well-being (7% of respondents), and addressing high prices of goods on the market (6% of respondents).

Figure 3: Respondents' main priority




Figure 4: Respondents proposed priority for the government



4.2. Employment and Poverty

The present survey did not focus on the economic conditions of the respondents. Nevertheless, several items confirm the economic challenges that respondents face. Just 12 percent of the respondents ranked their ability to find work as good or very good, compared to 66 percent who ranked their ability to find work as poor or very poor. Furthermore, regarding changes before and after the post-electoral violence, few respondents (4%) saw an improvement in opportunities to find work, while over one-half of the respondents (53%) said that work opportunities had declined. For 43 percent, opportunities to find work were similar before and after the violence. Perhaps more important, 65 percent saw poverty as having worsened over that period, compared to 29 percent who said poverty was the same, and 6% who said poverty had improved. Roughly one-third of the respondents (30%) reported a household income level below 30,000 CFA Francs per month, roughly equivalent to \$60 per month (or \$2/day).

Considering the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty, the survey found that only roughly one-half of the respondents ranked positively (good or very good) their access to health services (43%), access to education (48%), access to water (53%), access to food (56%), and access to housing (46%). Unlike access to work opportunities, which respondents generally perceived to be worsening, current access to basic needs was frequently cited as being similar to the conditions that existed before the 2011 violence. For 74 percent of respondents, current access to health care was similar to the 2010 pre-election conditions. Likewise, 73 percent said current access to education was similar at the time of the survey compared to the 2010 pre-election conditions.

4.3. Trust in Institutions

Strengthening the presence and authority of the state is generally considered a priority for peacebuilding in post-conflict countries such as

Côte d'Ivoire. While few respondents explicitly identified rebuilding trust in institutions as an individual or desired governmental priority, the survey finds that the post-election violence, which was deeply rooted in political divides, has undermined the relationship between the state and its citizens, at least in the main city of Abidjan. Rebuilding this relationship is a major challenge; roughly three out of four respondents declared having little or no trust in local or municipal authorities (79%), in departmental authorities (78%), or in national authorities (73%).


Only a little over one-third of respondents felt able to participate in national (34%) or city-level (35%) political processes, and only slightly more felt able to participate in commune- (39%) and local- (46%) level political processes. A majority of respondents (70%) did not believe that the national government is concerned with their conditions, while almost one-half of the respondents (49%) believed the government is only concerned about the conditions of some of its citizens. Just 14 percent of the respondents felt that elected officials at the national level represented their interests, and even fewer felt that elected officials at the provincial level represented their interests. Additionally, 63 percent felt that there was a big or very big difference between electoral promises and reality.

Box 1: Access to Information

The existence of free media and access to information is critical to advance democratic governance through increased transparency and accountability of the government to its citizens. Access to information also enables the population to engage and participate in public debates. The survey examined knowledge and access to information about justice and the International Criminal Court (see sections 1). To provide context for these data, the survey also included a section on

general access to information.

Respondents reported good access to information. Television was the most frequently consumed medium: 89 percent of the respondents watched television at least twice a week, and 69 percent watched television every day. Just 5 percent never watched television and 26 percent never listened to the radio. A little less than one-half of the respondents (46%) read newspapers at least occasionally. The study also looked at Internet access, showing that 45 percent of the respondents accessed the Internet at least occasionally, including 19 percent who accessed the Internet daily. The use of cellphones is widespread, with just 4 percent indicating that they never use a cellphone, and 92 percent indicating that they use a cellphone every day.



Despite the good access and frequent consumption of media, just one-third of the respondents reported being well or very well informed

about news in Abidjan (31%) and about national news (30%). Television was most frequently cited as the main source of information (68%).


Though the results confirm that television is the most trusted media platform, a significant proportion of respondents indicated distrust: 43 percent indicated having little or no trust in television as a source of information, compared to 61 percent for radio, and 80 percent for newspapers, the least trusted medium. Among informal sources of information, high proportions of respondents said they had little or no trust in their local leaders (80%) and political leaders (83%) as sources of information, while fewer respondents mistrusted their religious leaders (31%) and friends and family (50%) as sources of information, suggesting a strong distrust of authorities.

More specific information on media consumption was also collected.

- **Television:** The stations with the highest audiences were RTI 1 (74%) and RTI 2 (63%), followed by France 24 (24%) and Canal + (30%). Most respondents indicated watching the news on TV (72%), as well as movies/series (41%), sports (26%), and music (20%). The peak audience was between 19:00 and 21:00 in the evening (73%) compared to an audience of less than 27 percent of respondents at any other time.
- **Radio:** The audience for radio stations is more divided than that for television, reflecting the large selection of radio stations available. The highest audience was for RFI (32%), followed by Nostalgie FM (18%), Frequency 2 (17%), Radio Albayanne (12%), and Radio Espoir (11%). News reports were the most popular programs (47%), followed by religious broadcasts (26%), music (26%), and debates (12%). The audience was roughly constant during the day, with the highest proportion of respondents listening in the morning from 5:00 to 7:00 (30%), and 7:00 to 9:00 (26%).

- **Newspapers:** As stated above, 54 percent of respondents had never read a newspaper. *Fraternité Matin* was the most popular publication, with 18 percent of the respondents reading it at least occasionally. Other newspapers were each mentioned by less than 4 percent of the respondents.
- **Internet:** The Internet was used at least occasionally by nearly one-half of the respondents (45%), with 14 percent using their phones as the primary means to access the Internet (14%), while others used primarily Internet-cafes (13%), or a home-based computer (10%). Two out of five Internet users primarily consult social media sites (39%), followed by email sites (26%) and news sites (12%).
- **Mobile phone:** While the use of a mobile phone is widespread (93% daily use), fewer respondents indicated using their phone to send text messages at least occasionally (71%). Just 29 percent sent messages daily.

Figure 6: Distrust in sources of information (% little or no trust)



5. PERCEPTION OF SECURITY AND SOCIAL DIVIDES

Rebuilding security after instances of large-scale violence is a prerequisite for peace. Together with the fair and reliable delivery of justice, security creates the enabling environment required for reconciliation and reconstruction. Despite significant recent improvements, insecurity persists in Abidjan and throughout Côte d'Ivoire, most notably in the west of the country. Insecurity remains in part because of distrust between communities, unresolved land ownership issues, difficulties in the integration of armed groups and the demobilization of combatants, and a lack of impartial accountability for security actors that were involved in the violence. The study explored perceptions of security and security actors among respondents.

5.1. Sense of Security

A majority of respondents in Abidjan reported feeling safe or very safe in daily activities such as going to work (59%), walking in their neighborhood during the day (62%) or going to the nearest market (62%). A majority of respondents also reported feeling safe or very safe when encountering security actors, including policemen (66%) and soldiers (57%). The results nevertheless suggest that a significant proportion of respondents (from 34% to 43%) did not feel safe in these situations. Less than one-half of the respondents reported feeling safe sleeping (46%) or walking alone at night (32%). Most important, few respondents reported feeling safe in situations of social interaction such as going to another neighborhood (41%) or meeting strangers (29%), suggesting that tensions and distrust remain among the population, likely along

political and ethnic lines. Few respondents felt safe talking openly about their experiences during the conflict (29%).

Whether or not security is improving seems to vary across respondents: 39 percent said security was worsening, but 32 percent said security was improving. The rest (29%) said security remained the same.

Figure 7: Perception of security (%safe-very safe)




5.2. Source of Insecurity: the Persistence of Social Divides

Sixty-one percent of the respondents identified the fear of being attacked as their main source of insecurity. Data on perceptions of secu-

rity and social dynamics, however, suggest that a main driver of insecurity is the lack of trust and tensions between groups in the population. Most respondents indicated having good relations with their neighbors (69%), with members of their own ethnic group (73%), or with members of other ethnic groups (68%). However, more than one-half of the respondents indicated that trust between people was lower at the time of the survey compared to before the electoral violence. The study examined generalized trust between respondents and a number of actors. At the time of the survey, only 30 percent of the respondents indicated having trust toward family members. However, at least two-thirds or more of the respondents had little or no trust toward neighbors (69%), members of their own ethnic group (62%), members of another ethnic group (69%), people with the same political opinions as theirs (67%), and people with other political opinions (78%). With regards to religious affiliation, 64 percent of the respondents had little or no trust in members of another religious group, compared to just 40 percent who had little or no trust in members of their own religious group. The results suggest that although people may have good day-to-day relationships with others, an underlying sense of mistrust remains.

Figure 8: Generalized trust
(% with little or no trust toward ...)



5.3. Criminality

Insecurity was associated with a fear of being attacked. One driver of this fear is the persistence of social divisions and mistrust. However, criminality is also a significant issue in Abidjan. The incidence of various crimes over the one-year period prior to the survey was assessed. In total, 40 percent of the respondents reported having experienced at least one crime in the year prior to the survey. The most commonly reported crimes were events of extortion or corruption (20%), generally associated with security forces and/or civil servants. These events are likely to reinforce the mistrust in the state documented in this study. The second most common event was unarmed robberies, experienced by 17 percent of the respondents during the one-year period before the survey. Other frequent events include armed robberies (8%), physical violence without a weapon (4%) or physical violence with a weapon (3%). One in ten respondents (10%) also indicated victimization due to sorcery (10%). Finally, one percent reported experiences of sexual violence.

5.4. Weapons

A number of crimes experienced by respondents involved weapons. As in many post-conflict situations, disarming former combatants has proven difficult, and a range of small arms and weapons remain in the hands of civilians. Despite the availability of weapons, few respondents indicate that it would be acceptable to take arms to defend the interests of a politician (1%), or an ethnic group (1%), or a religious group (1%). Similarly, few respondents indicated that taking up arms to protect the community from its enemy (2%) or to render justice (2%) is acceptable.

5.5. Disputes

In addition to the incidence of crimes, the survey focused on respondents' experiences regarding a wide array of types of disputes. Such disputes, if left unaddressed, have the potential to threaten stability and evolve into violent conflicts. According to respondents, theft (31%), domestic disputes (26%), and physical or sexual violence (14%) were the most common problems experienced in their neighborhood, followed by disputes over money/payments (6%), ethnic or religious disputes (5%), and political disputes (4%). Few respondents (12%) reported having experienced disputes themselves over the twelve-month period prior to the survey. When questioned about disputes they themselves experienced, respondents most frequently reported instances of theft (27%), domestic disputes (27%), and conflicts over money/payments (18%).


Box 2: Exposure to Violence During the 2010–2011 Post-election Crisis

Previous studies have established that experiences of war-related violence are associated with perceptions about peace and justice.⁴⁵ This study examined the overall exposure to violence in Abidjan during the 2010 post-election period. Exposure to 20 events caused by armed groups such as witnessing violence, direct experience of violence, family losses, and coercion during the conflict was assessed. Displacement (50%) and separation from household family members (38%) were the most frequently reported event.

Experiences as a witness were also relatively frequent, including witnessing fighting (36%), looting (33%), beating and torture (31%), and killing (25%). With regards to direct experiences, one in four respondents (26%) had property stolen or destroyed, and five percent were physically attacked or beaten. Less than one percent of the respondents

reported various forms of coerced experience such as being forced to work as a porter (0.8%), or being forced to loot (0.8%). One in four respondents (24%) reported having experienced no violence.

Figure 9: Most frequent experiences of violence caused by armed group during the 2010 post-electoral violence



6. SECURITY AND JUSTICE ACTORS


Functioning security and justice sectors are key components of a country's governance, enabling a safe environment where the rule of law and basic human rights are respected. How people perceive these sectors is closely associated with how they judge their government.⁴⁶ As outlined in Section 4.3 (Trust in Institutions), Abidjan remains close to a state of crisis, with respondents reporting little or no trust in local, municipal, departmental and national authorities. This section presents results on the population's perception of national security and justice actors, including the level of trust and perception of performance in both sectors.

6.1. Perception of Security Actors and Opportunities for Improvement

Perceptions of security actors appear to be relatively poor. When asked questions about security actors using an open-ended interview, respondents most frequently mentioned that nobody provided security in their neighborhood (41%). Some identified themselves (21%), private security guards (11%), or God (10%) as providing security. The police was mentioned by more than one in four respondents (27%) and the national army by 6 percent.

Despite the low proportion of respondents stating that police provide protection, it remains a key security actor. Most respondents (62%) reported having little or no trust in the police. However, most respondents (66%) felt safe or very safe meeting policemen. Furthermore, when asked what needed to be done to improve security in their neighborhoods, respondents mentioned increasing the presence of the police (69%) as well as training police (8%). Other responses included increas-

ing the presence of the military (15%), deploying private security guards (5%), and training the military (3%). Among responses not directly related to security actors, respondents also identified educating the population (11%) as well as providing work/employment (10%) as a way to improve security. Respondents also mentioned the need for electricity / public lighting.




6.2. Crimes and Dispute Resolution: Actors and Perceptions

Crimes and disputes are frequently addressed or resolved outside of formal justice systems. The survey asked respondents whom they would contact to resolve a specified series of crimes or disputes. The question was presented in hypothetical terms but nevertheless reflects the ac-

tions likely to be undertaken should respondents be confronted with any of the events listed. First, the survey asked, in general, whom respondents would contact to resolve a dispute. Respondents most frequently said that the population itself (53%) would resolve the dispute. More than one in four said they would contact the police (27%), and less frequently neighborhood authorities (12%) or customary chiefs (4%). Considering specific events, however, responses varied considerably. Family disputes would be primarily handled by the population itself (88%). For domestic violence and disputes related to money / payment, around half of the respondents said such disputes would be resolved by the population itself (57% and 47% respectively), but around one in three said they would contact the police (30% and 35% respectively). In cases of physical violence, theft, murder, or sexual violence, over three-quarters of the respondents said they would contact the police. Although cases may ultimately end in courts, the justice system was not mentioned frequently as the primary contact point to resolve disputes, except to some extent in cases of land disputes (23%). The results show that in the urban context of Abidjan, local and traditional authorities have only a limited role in addressing disputes.

The hypothetical results are confirmed by actual cases. As noted in Section 5.5, 12 percent of the respondents indicated having experienced disputes in the 12 months prior to the survey. The survey further found that 50 percent of these respondents said they resolved the conflict themselves and 21 percent said that they contacted the police. Other actors contacted include neighborhood authorities (8%), the national justice system (4%), religious leaders (3%), and customary authorities (3%).

Figure 11: Actors contacted for dispute resolution in hypothetical events (% respondents)



The main factor driving the choice of dispute-resolution actor when experiencing a conflict is that minor disputes—the most frequently experienced—are typically handled by the selected actors. Trust was also an important factor for 25 percent of the respondents in selecting an avenue for dispute resolution.

Regarding crimes, data suggest that individuals rarely reported crimes that they themselves had experienced. Of the 40 percent of the respondents who reported having experienced a crime in the 12 months prior to the survey, just 18 percent had filed a complaint. Among those who did not file a complaint, 76 percent said that doing so would be useless, 7 percent said they had nowhere to go, about 5 percent feared the consequences, and the rest (12%) provided other reasons.

The vast majority of those who filed a complaint went to the police (90%). The results also showed that few were ultimately satisfied with the outcome (24%). The main factors undermining satisfaction were perceptions that nothing was done to find those responsible (67%), that it took too much time (7%), or that nothing came out of the complaint (7%). Another 18 percent provided other responses.

6.3. Perceptions of the National Justice System

A majority of respondents reported having an average level of knowledge of the national justice system in Côte d'Ivoire (51%), while two out of five respondents judged their knowledge to be bad or very bad (40%).

As noted in Section 4.3, trust in state institutions is low. This is also true of justice actors, with 64 percent of the respondents indicating little or no trust in the justice system; one-third (33%) responded positively ('it works well') when asked an open-ended question about their perceptions of the justice system. Another 3 percent had no opinion, and 64 percent

expressed negative perceptions, including statements that justice is corrupted (37%), that justice simply does not exist / is ineffective (28%), that justice is biased in favor of the rich or powerful (11%), and that one must pay in order to get justice (7%).

Figure 12: Knowledge about the national justice system (% of respondents)





Figure 13: Trust in the national justice system (% of respondents)




These negative perceptions are confirmed by responses to a series of statements that interviewers provided to respondents for agreement or disagreement. About one in five respondents agreed that judges and prosecutors respect the rights of the defendants (28%), that tribunals treat everyone fairly and equally (21%), or that decisions are taken fairly at the tribunals (20%). Rather, many respondents noted the inconsistency of services by identifying the aforementioned statements as being only sometimes true (44%, 47% and 51% respectively), or completely false (28%, 32%, and 29%) respectively. There was slightly more frequent agreement that payment was needed to have one's case examined (38%) and frequent agreement that victims of sexual violence can see their cases judged in tribunals.

Figure 14: Perceptions of the national justice system



Box 3: Improving justice

When asked what needed to be done to improve the justice system, respondents addressed the most frequent criticism of the justice sector. Specifically, respondents mentioned the need to fight corruption (53%), train judges and lawyers (30%), inform or educate the population itself (15%), and ensure the independence of justice (10%).



7. JUSTICE AND THE 2010—11 POST-ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

Countries that experienced instances of large-scale violence may undertake a range of transitional justice policies to deal with the atrocities, including criminal trials (national, international or hybrid), truth commissions, reparations measures for victims and communities, and removal of past offenders from office.⁴⁷ In the aftermath of the post-election violence, the government of Côte d'Ivoire has taken a number of steps to address the crimes. As noted earlier in this paper, the Ivorian government established a Cellule Spéciale d'Enquête, or the Special Investigative Cell, under the Ministry of Justice; established the CDVR, and accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC to undertake investigation under the provisions of article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute. Additionally, the UN Human Rights Council mandated a commission of inquiry to gather information about the situation and subsequently mandated a country-specific independent expert to continue reporting on the human rights situation in the country.

Despite these steps, the local population has questioned the credibility of these various processes, especially national criminal prosecutions, which local and international actors have claimed are akin to victor's justice due to their one-sided nature. Côte d'Ivoire faces the challenge of securing peace while maintaining accountability for serious crimes among all actors. The survey included a series of questions that aimed to examine the perceptions of various mechanisms among the population.

7.1. Priorities and Accountability

Respondents did not mention justice frequently when identifying their priorities or their thoughts on what the priorities of the government should be (Section 4). The survey also asked respondents what they thought should be done to achieve peace. Respondents provided a large number of answers, the most frequent being to establish the truth (20%), to create dialogue between ethnic groups (20%), to increase employment (13%), to grant amnesties (9%), to arrest/jail those responsible for the violence (9%), and to compensate victims (5%). In other words, respondents perceive several justice mechanisms and processes as necessary to achieve peace.

Figure 16: Is accountability important for the 2010 post-election violence?





Figure 17: Necessary to have justice for the violence?



When asked directly, over one-half of the respondents said that it was important to hold the perpetrators of violence accountable for their acts (55%) and that obtaining justice for the violence was necessary (69%). Despite these results, nearly all respondents said they would accept the forgiveness of perpetrators if it was the only way to get

peace. Those who said accountability was not important generally said that rather, it was forgiveness that was necessary (44%), that accountability might lead to renewed violence (29%), and that it was best to forget (18%). Eight percent provided other answers.


The results suggest that justice is seen as an important process, but that at the same time, the actors of the justice sector are not trusted. The survey asked respondents to rank their perceptions of the commitment of various authorities toward achieving justice. Over two-thirds of the respondents (69%) said that the government showed little or no willingness to achieve justice for the post-election violence. Slightly more respondents (71%) said the national justice system had little or no willingness to hold perpetrators accountable. Finally, 68 percent felt that the ICC had little or no willingness to achieve justice.

7.2. Criminal Justice

To explore further the mechanisms that the population would like to see used to address the history of violence, we used the open-ended design of the interview to ask respondents what, if anything, should be done with those responsible for the violence in Abidjan. The most frequent response was that perpetrators needed to face trials (42%). Others said that perpetrators should be punished (18%) or put in jail (11%). However, a number of respondents said that perpetrators should be forgiven (26%) or that perpetrators should simply ask for forgiveness (22%) and confess the truth about what they have done (14%).

Given the choice, however, a number of respondents favored holding trials in the country by national courts (56%), rather than having international trials in the country (9%), or elsewhere (17%). Four percent said they would prefer having no trials at all.

Figure 18: Perception of willingness to achieve justice for the post-election violence




Box 4: Information and Knowledge about the International Criminal Court

The survey included several questions to understand better the level of knowledge about the ICC among the population. These factors influence how individuals perceive the role and effect of the ICC on justice and the reconstruction process.⁴⁸ A majority of the population had heard about the ICC (94%, including 5% who had heard of 'the court where Gbagbo is'). Awareness was lower among women (90%) compared to men (98%).

The high level of awareness about the existence of the ICC likely reflects good access to media. Sources of information about the ICC are consistent with media consumption data. A majority of the population had heard about the ICC through any media (86%), while 8 percent had heard about the ICC from informal channels only (family, friends, authorities), and 6 percent had never heard about it. Looking at specific sources, 78 percent of the respondents had heard about the ICC on

television, by far the most frequent source of information.

Fewer respondents had heard about the ICC on the radio (27%) or in newspapers (21%). In the media, respondents had most frequently heard journalists talk about the ICC (57%). Fewer had heard politicians (12%), other local leaders (13%), or court representatives themselves (12%) talk about the Court.



The following analysis focuses on respondents who had heard about the ICC (94% of the sample).

The sources of information confirm that in-person meetings are not a frequent source of information about the ICC. Just two respondents had participated in such meetings, and in both cases, civil society actors organized these meetings. However, 56 percent of those who heard about the ICC indicated having talked about the ICC with friends and neighbors. Few respondents indicated having actively searched for information about the ICC (12%), and 68 percent said they had little or no interest in the work of the Court.

7.3. Perceptions of the International Criminal Court


The following analysis focuses on respondents who had heard about the ICC (94% of the sample).

Box 4: Information and Knowledge about the International Criminal Court) outlines results regarding information and knowledge about the ICC among the population of Abidjan. The survey further explored how respondents perceived the Court and its effect on the country's reconstruction.

Most respondents had little or no trust in the ICC (67%). However, these results must be seen in the context of distrust in institutions in general and of justice actors specifically. While low, the level of general distrust for the ICC is similar to the level of distrust for the national justice system (65%), and it is notably lower than the levels of distrust documented toward local or municipal authorities (79% had little or no trust), departmental authorities (78% had little or no trust), or national authorities (73% had little or no trust).

Views about the ICC were more positive when respondents who had heard about the Court were asked openly about their thoughts of the Court. About half the respondents had positive views (47%). Interviewers offered respondents the opportunity to provide multiple responses and respondents most frequently mentioned that the ICC was doing its work (46%) and that the Court would bring justice (7%). About the same percentage of the respondents (46%) held negative views about the ICC. Respondents most frequently cited the perception that the Court (1) is pursuing only one group (24%) or (2) being biased toward the government (9%), the military (1%) or unspecified biases (6%). Over one in eight respondents (13%) said the Court was not doing anything and 7 percent said specifically that the Court was not arresting those responsible for the violence.

Figure 20: Perceptions of the ICC



Views on the effect of the ICC on peace and justice were divided. When asked how respondents perceived the impact of the court on peace, a little more than one-third said that the Court had a positive impact (35%), and slightly fewer said the Court had a negative impact (34%). The others were neutral (31%). Similarly, when asked about the impact on justice, 32 percent said it had a positive impact and the same percentage mentioned a negative, with 36 percent being neutral. Finally, thinking about the future, the results did not change significantly, with 35 percent predicting a positive impact on justice, 30 percent predicting a negative impact, and 35 percent remaining neutral.


The survey also asked about victims' abilities to participate in the proceedings at the ICC. A little more than half of the respondents were

interested to learn more about possibilities to participate (51%). However, less than one in three (30%) would consider participating in the proceedings themselves. Those who wanted to participate mentioned as the main objectives telling about their experiences (43%), being recognized as a victim (32%), and facing the accused (18%). The desires for assistance (8%) or compensation (8%) were not major incentives for participation.

7.4. Truth

The need to understand what happened and why it happened is consistent across societies who have experienced mass violence. In Abidjan, 69 percent of the population mentioned it was important to know the origin of the conflict and the same percentage (69%) said it was important to establish the truth about what happened.

Figure 21: Perceptions of the impact of the ICC



When asked why establishing the truth about what happened was important, the most frequent response was that it was needed to establish responsibilities (40%), to know history (31%), and to stop impunity (12%). However, those who said it was not necessary to know the truth


about what happened generally felt it was best to forget (46%), that it would bring bad memories (22%) and that it was best to think about the future (16%).

In Section 5.1, data on the sense of security held by residents of Abidjan showed that respondents frequently felt least safe speaking openly about their experiences during the conflict; only 29 percent of respondents expressed feeling safe or very safe. Despite these results, 54 percent said they would agree to speak openly about their experiences if requested. Looking beyond individual stories, many respondents indicated that, in their opinion, the best way to establish the truth would be holding trials (47%), letting people talk freely (41%), establishing a truth commission (20%), and letting the media do their work (6%). Nine percent of respondents said it was best not to seek to establish the truth.

7.5. Reparations and Measures for Victims

Finally, the survey asked more generally what respondents thought needed to be done for victims of the conflict. The most common answers focused on tangible assets as forms of compensation, including money (43%), food (20%), and farm animals (10%). Various services, including education and health services, were also mentioned by 22 percent of respondents as potential compensation measures. Overall, replacing losses is a key component of reparations for the respondents; 54 percent said replacing lost goods was the most important aspect of compensation. Possibly because of those expectations, few respondents said that they would accept measures that are purely symbolic (32%) or purely at the community level and not individual (36%). The most negative response came when respondents were asked if they would agree that no measures should be taken for victims. Only 5 percent of the sample responded affirmatively to this question.

Figure 22: Important to know the truth about what happened?



8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Three years after President Alassane Ouattara took office, Côte d'Ivoire remains close to a state of crisis, despite significant improvements. This survey was undertaken to provide representative and up-to-date data on perceptions about security and justice in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. This report, based on a representative survey of 1,000 adults residing in Abidjan, documents the lingering effect of decades of political instability and violence, resulting today in a crisis of trust between the state and its citizens and among citizens themselves. The report shows, for example, low levels of trust toward both local and national leaders and among the population. Respondents further showed little or no trust in their local and political leaders as sources of information.

The study also finds that the lack of trust and tensions between groups in the population is a main driver of insecurity. Residents felt least safe when meeting strangers or traveling to other neighborhoods, for example.

The lack of trust in institutions may be the result of a perceived lack of control over national and local policy processes. Together with the absence of social cohesion, this contributes to maintaining a climate of fear and tension. The study finds little sign of improvements in mutual trust for most respondents; trust between people was lower at the time of the survey compared to before the electoral violence.

The trust crisis extends to the security and justice sector, in which a majority of residents have little or no confidence. The police, like all of the state institutions examined here, do not inspire trust among the population. This distrust may be reinforced by the high levels of crime and the great number of disputes that the respondents experienced. The popu-

lation nevertheless perceives the police to be a primary point of contact to resolve crimes and disputes, and the police force remains the most frequently cited formal security agency ensuring the safety of residents of the city, outside of informal actors (e.g., the community itself).

Among the main grievances with the justice sector, respondents mentioned a system that is seen as corrupt and benefitting the powerful. Perceived bias in prosecuting those responsible for the 2011 post-election violence may contribute to reinforcing the negative perception of the justice system. Despite the lack of trust, many residents would like to see those responsible for the violence held accountable and noted the overall importance of achieving justice. A majority of respondents would also like to see such trials held in Côte d'Ivoire rather than in another country. At the same time, there are large numbers of respondents who are against accountability, arguing that accountability efforts could generate new tensions and even a return to conflict.

Overall, respondents were relatively well-informed about events and news in Abidjan. Television is especially widespread and used as a main source of information. Television is also the primary media platform from which respondents received information about the ICC. This, in part, shapes perceptions of the Court. Perceptions of the ICC are in line with those of state institutions, with low levels of trust in both. However, when asked more openly about the ICC, about one-half of the respondents were positive about the Court. Their views on the effect of the ICC on peace and justice, however, remain divided. This may reflect the fact that proceedings are ongoing, as well as the self-reported low level of knowledge of the Court.

One aspect more generally agreed upon among the population is the need to know the truth about what happened. For respondents, it is most frequently associated with the need to assign responsibilities. Despite this need for truth, few respondents feel comfortable talking about their experience during the violence.

Based on these findings, as well as the more detailed results presented throughout this report, the following key recommendations are made to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire; international actors, including relevant organs of the UN and the ICC; and civil society actors, including individuals and organizations within Côte d'Ivoire and international non-governmental organizations:

1. Address key economic priorities (especially employment).
2. Emphasize rebuilding trust between the state and its citizens as a core component of the reconstruction effort—a renewed social contract—with a focus on local level authorities (the least trusted). Develop and support programs that strengthen linkages between communities and institutions.
3. Deploy, train, and properly equip police officers; examine and potentially expand the current mandate of the police to ensure that services are available locally; and contribute to rebuilding trust and reducing violence.
4. Ensure the independence of the justice system. Specifically, adopt and support anti-corruption policies and programs to re-establish the rule of law and support the local prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities from all sides to the conflict
5. Build on the outcome of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and further support the National Social Cohesion Program as a means of engaging the population in a constructive dialogue about the conflict. Involve the media in this process, especially television in Abidjan.
6. Provide sufficient human and financial support to the special investigative cell within the Justice Ministry investigating the 2010–2011 post-election violence, and guarantee its judicial independence.

7. Develop a reparations program that is unbiased and financially realistic to address the strong demand for reparations among the population. This program will need to address and manage expectations for individual financial compensation as a key component of reparation.
8. Outreach in Abidjan about justice, especially the ICC, should take advantage of the high level of access to television among the population to establish ongoing communication and exchanges with those affected by the conflict.
9. The ICC should coordinate its work with national and international efforts to strengthen the justice sector to rebuild trust and credibility in national justice institutions.

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“Fragile Peace, Elusive Justice” explores perception and attitudes about security and justice in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire in the aftermath of the 2010—11 post-electoral violence. It is based on a population survey conducted in December 2013 among a random sample of 1,000 individuals, representative of the adult population.

The study examines how the violence affected individuals and their views on security, justice, and the reconstruction process. It features a background to the conflict and analysis on:

- Priorities of respondents
- Employment and Poverty
- Trust in Institutions
- Access to Information
- Perception of Security and Social Divides
- Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
- Perception of Justice and Justice actors
- Justice and the 2010—11 Post-electoral violence
- Truth, Reparations and Measures for Victims



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